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Abstract
This Note argues that the U.S. Government should discontinue all attempts to establish EES as
the de facto encryption standard in the United States because the economic disadvantages associ-
ated with widespread implementation of EES outweigh the advantages this advanced data security
system provides. Part I discusses the EU’s legislative efforts to ensure personal data security and
analyzes the evolution of encryption technology in the United States. Part II examines the methods
employed by the U.S. Government to establish EES as the de facto U.S. encryption standard. Part
III argues that the U.S. Government should terminate its effort to establish EES as the de facto U.S.
encryption standard and institute an alternative standard that ensures continued U.S. participation
in the international marketplace.
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INTRODUCTION
The amount of personal data1 processed2 on computer net-
works is approaching staggering proportions.3 This growing de-
pendence on information systems raises personal data security4
concerns among computer users.5 Responding to these con-
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. Common Position (EC) No. 1/95, O.J. L 93/01 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Direc-
tive No. 1/95]. The Directive form of the Common Position, which was adopted July
24, 1995, remains unpublished. Council Definitively Adopts Directive on Protection of Per-
sonal Data, European Commission Press Release, July 24, 1995 [hereinafter Council De-
finitively Adapts Directive on Protection of Personal Data] (on file with Fordham International
Law Journal). The 1995 Directive defines "personal data" as:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
("data subject"); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cul-
tural or social identity.
1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra, art 2(a), O.J. L 93/01, at 7 (1995).
2. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 2(b), O.J. L 93/01, at 7 (1995). The
1995 Directive defines "processing of personal data" as:
[A]ny operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organiza-
tion, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure
by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.
Id.
3. See Lance J. Hoffman et al., Cryptography Policy, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM,
Sept. 1994, at 109, 110 [hereinafter Oyptography Policy] (describing exponential in-
crease in processed data);JoEL KURTZMAN, THE DEATH OF MONEY 30-31 (1993) (stating
that Solomon Brothers annually trades approximately US$2 trillion worth of securities
and runs equivalent of total U.S. bank holdings through company's computer net-
works); G.B.F. Niblett, Computers and Privacy, in PRIVACY, COMPUTERS AND You 17, 17
(B.C. Rowe ed., 1972) (suggesting that reasons for growth of technology include desire
for efficiency and urge to achieve maximum production with minimum effort).
4. LANCE J. HOFFMAN, MODERN METHODS FOR COMPUTER SECURITY AND PRIVACY 2
(1977). "Data security is the protection of data against accidental or intentional de-
struction, disclosure, or modification." Id.
5. See Hilary E. Pearson, Data Protection in Europe, COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1991, at
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cerns, the European Union6 ("EU") and the U.S. Government
are implementing data security measures within their respective
jurisdictions.7
The European Union relies on legislation to foster personal
data security on computer networks.8 On July 24, 1995, the Eu-
ropean Union adopted the European Community's9 ("EC")
24, 24 (stating that individuals in Europe and United States are concerned about data
privacy because of increased use of computerized databases); Paige Amidon, Wening
Privacy Concerns, ONLINE, July 1992, at 64, 64 (concluding that almost 80% of U.S. citi-
zens are concerned about computer-related privacy issues).
6. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on the European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNriTES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Until 1995, the twelve European Union
("EU") Member States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. TEU,
supra, pmbl. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became EU Member
States. Sweden, Finland and Austria Join European Union, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1995, at A8.
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 2-18
(1993). The TEU, which became effective on January 1, 1993, superceded EC treaties
and established the European Union. Id. at 16. An economic crisis in the mid-1970's
and problems within the European Community in the 1980's, including political differ-
ences regarding reform of common agricultural policy and EC financial problems, em-
phasized the importance of creating a unified Europe. Id. at 13-14. In response, com-
munity leaders developed the TEU. Id. at 13. TEU provisions are divided into two
categories: economic and monetary union and political union. Id. at 16. Economic
and monetary coordination is scheduled to occur in several stages. Id. at 16-17. The
first stage involves creation of the European Monetary Institute ("EMI") to coordinate
the activities of the central banks. Id. at 17. The second stage requires creation of
independent central banks in Member States that do not currently possess them, elimi-
nation of excessive deficits, and the formation of a plan for complete monetary union.
Id. The third stage entails creating a European System of Central Banks. Id. By 1999, a
single currency is scheduled to replace the national currencies. Id. The TEU is consid-
ered a crucial step towards European political integration, as it will expand the Commu-
nity sphere in a variety of areas including immigration,justice, and health. Id. at 17-18.
7. See 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, pmbl., O.J. L 93/01, at 1 (1995) (out-
lining comprehensive plan to ensure personal data protection and free movement of
personal data within European Union). See also Statement of the Press Secretary, The White
House Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 4, 1994 (on file with Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter Statement of the Press Secretary] (describing Escrowed Encryption
Standard as encryption standard that provides advanced computer data security).
8. See 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), (2), O.J. L 93/01, at 12
(1995) (mandating that EU Member States implement technical measures to protect
personal data security).
9. BERMANN, supra note 6, at 2. The European Community ("EC") preceded the
EU. Id. The EC consisted of several Communities, including: the European Coal and
1995] PERSONAL DATA SECURITY
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data ("1995 Directive"). Arti-
cle 17 of the 1995 Directive1" ("Article 17") addresses personal
data security and requires data controllers1 2 to implement state
of the art" security measures when processing personal data.'
Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Defense Com-
munity, and the European Political Community. Id. at 2-6. The EC was initially cre-
ated as a means to integrate the European economic market and increase the Euro-
pean standard of living. Id. at 2. During its thirty-five year tenure, however, the EC also
fostered political, social, and cultural integration. Id.; see supra note 6 (presenting
twelve EC Member States).
10. See 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, arts. 6-18, O.J. L 93/01, at 8-13
(1995) (outlining data controller's affirmative duties and prohibitions regarding per-
sonal data processing and discussing data transfers to third party countries). The EU's
Council of Ministers adopted an earlier draft of the 1995 Directive on February 20,
1995. EU Council Approves Standards for Protections of Data Privacy, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN.
DAILY, Feb. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily File [here-
inafter EU Council Approves Standards for Protections of Data Privacy]. The Council of Min-
isters then adopted a modified version of this early draft onJuly 24, 1995. Council Defin-
itively Adopts Directive on Protection of Personal Data, supra note 1.
11. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), (2), O.J. L 93/01, at 12
(1995). Article 17 provides, in relevant part:
1. Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropri-
ate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against ac-
cidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss and against unauthorized
alteration, disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the
transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of
processing. Having regard to the state of the art and the costs of their imple-
mentation, such measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected.
2. The Member States shall provide that the controller must, where the
processing is carried out on his behalf, choose a processor who provides suffi-
cient guarantees in respect of the technical security measures and organiza-
tional measures governing the processing to be carried out and must ensure
compliance with those measures.
Id.
12. Id. art. 2(d), O.J. L 93/01, at 7 (1995). The 1995 Directive defines "controller"
as:
[A]ny natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body who
processes personal data or causes it to be processed and who decides what is
the purpose and objective of the processing, which personal data are to be
processed, which operations are to be performed upon them and which third
parties are to have access to them.
Id.
13. Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Explanatory Memorandum, COM (92)
422 Final (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Proposal Explanatory Memorandum] (defin-
ing "state of the art" as appropriate technical measures to protect data).
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The U.S. Government, in contrast, responds to personal
data security concerns with the development of encryption"5
technology.1 6 The Escrowed Encryption Standard 7 ("EES") rep-
resents the U.S. Government's current attempt to alleviate data
security concerns in the United States."8 EES features key es-
crow technology,19 which guarantees advanced data security and
allows U.S. Government agencies to intercept data communica-
tions for law enforcement purposes.20  The U.S. Government
seeks to establish EES as the defacto encryption standard in the
United States. 1
This Note argues that the U.S. Government should discon-
tinue all attempts to establish EES as the defacto encryption stan-
dard in the United States because the economic disadvantages
14. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), (2), O.J. L 93/01, at 12
(1995).
15. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY
AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 113 (1994) [hereinafter OTA] (defining en-
cryption as method by which contents of message are concealed).
16. See Ira S. Rubenstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 177, 182 (PLI COM. LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
No. A4-4458, 1994) (discussing how computers equipped with encryption technology
that allow users to transform computerized data into form which is incomprehensible
to all unauthorized users).
17. Jaleen Nelson, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and Its
Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1139, 1140 (1994). The
Escrowed Encryption Standard ("EES") is comprised of two components, the Clipper
Chip and the Capstone Chip. Id. The Capstone Chip encrypts high-speed data trans-
missions, whereas the Clipper Chip encrypts low-speed data and voice conversations.
Id.
18. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7.
19. OTA, supra note 15, at 173. Chip-specific keys required to access encrypted
communications are held in escrow, allowing a party to retrieve a key from the escrow
agent and decrypt the encrypted information. Id. The National Institute of Technol-
ogy estimated that establishing key escrow technology in EES cost US$14 million, and
annual operating costs for the agents holding the keys in escrow approaches US$16
million. Id.
20. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7. Key escrow technology permits law
enforcement and other agencies to conduct legally authorized wiretaps. Id. Conse-
quently, key escrow technology will allow agencies to intercept incriminating communi-
cations processed over telephones and modems by potential terrorists, drug dealers,
and other criminals. Id.
21. See Cryptography Policy, supra note 3, at 109 (explaining how U.S. Government
employs export controls to eliminate competing devices from U.S. encryption market);
James Fallows, Open Secrets: Why the So-Called Clipper Chip - Vilified As A Threat to the Pri-
vacy of Electronic Communications - Is Not Worth Losing Sleep Over, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June
1994, at 50 (stating that U.S. Government's purchasing power is so great that it pos-
sesses ability to influence types of technology available on U.S. encryption market).
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associated with widespread implementation of EES outweigh the
advantages this advanced data security system provides. Part I
discusses the EU's legislative efforts to ensure personal data se-
curity and analyzes the evolution of encryption technology in the
United States. Part II examines the methods employed by the
U.S. Government to establish EES as the defacto U.S. encryption
standard. Part II also presents the advantages and disadvantages
associated with the widespread implementation of EES. Addi-
tionally, Part II discusses recent developments in the U.S. Gov-
ernment's quest to ensure data security in the United States.
Part III argues that the U.S. Government should terminate its
effort to establish EES as the de facto U.S. encryption standard
and institute an alternative standard that ensures continued U.S.
participation in the international marketplace. This Note con-
cludes that the successful establishment of EES as the de facto
U.S. encryption standard will prevent the United States from ac-
tively participating in the international marketplace.
I. EU AND U.S. DATA SECURITY STANDARDS
The European Union and the United States approach the
issue of personal data security differently.22 The European
Union develops legislation to ensure personal data security. 23
These legislative efforts culminated in a state of the art standard
for the protection of personal data.24 The U.S. Government
does not rely upon legislation to protect data processed over
computer networks. 25 Instead, to achieve this goal, the U.S. Gov-
ernment advocates the development of encryption technology.26
The most recently released U.S. encryption standard features
key escrow technology. 27
22. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (discussing EU legislative efforts to
ensure security of personal data processed on computer networks); supra notes 15-20
and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Government development of encryption tech-
nology).
23. See Herald D.J. Jongen & Gerrit A. Vriezen, The Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Community, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACy 140-155 (Dennis Campbell &Joy
Fisher eds., 1994) (examining various EU legislative efforts regarding personal data
protection).
24. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), O.J. L 93/01, at 12 (1995).
25. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7.
26. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing most recently released
encryption technology in United States).
27. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7.
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A. Development of the EU's Personal Data Security Standard
In the late 1960's, governmental bodies within the Euro-
pean Union"8 determined that the rights and obligations associ-
ated with computerized personal data required governmental
regulation.29 In the 1970's, several EU Member States indepen-
dently adopted national data protection legislation."0 Each of
the national initiatives included a data security provision, how-
ever, these provisions created incompatible data security stan-
dards that obstructed the free transfer of personal data among
EU Member States."' In the early 1980's, two EU entities"2
drafted international documents in an attempt to harmonize na-
tional data protection laws, including national data security pro-
visions.33 These international efforts, however, failed to create
uniformity among existing national laws.3 4 Article 17, the Euro-
pean Union's most recent legislation concerning data security,
attempts to harmonize Member States' national data security
provisions.3 5
28. See A.C.M. NUTGER, TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 20
(Computer/Law Series No. 6, 1990) (naming Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") and Council of Europe ("COE") as two governmental
bodies concerned with personal data protection).
29. Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 140.
30. Id. Between 1974 and 1979, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Norway, and Sweden enacted general data protection laws. Id.
31. See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 1980 O.E.C.D.
Doc C (80) 58 Final at 17 (Oct. 1980), 20 I.L.M. 422, 430 [hereinafter OECD Guide-
lines] (explaining that general differences among national legislations included scope
of legislation, implementation of principles outlined in legislation, and method of en-
forcement); Pearson, supra, note 5, at 24 (stating that incongruous legislation pre-
vented data flows between European countries and, consequently, had significant
ramifications on public and commercial institutions in Europe).
32. See NUTGER, supra note 28, at 20 (discussing attempts by the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development and the Council of Europe to harmonize
national data protection laws).
33. OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, 1980 O.E.C.D. Doc C (80) 58 Final, 20 LL.M.
422; Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data, April 21,1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981) [hereinafter
COE Convention].
34. See Council Adopts Common Position on Protection of Personal Data Directive, Euro-
pean Commission Press Release, Feb. 21, 1995 [hereinafter Council Adopts Common Posi-
tion on Protection of Personal Data Directive] (on file with Fordham International LawJournal)
(stating that international documents did not adequately rectify incompatibilities
among national legislation).
35. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), (2), OJ. L 93/01, at 12
(1995).
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1. National Data Security Provisions
In 1968, the Council of Europe's36 ("COE") Parliamentary
Assembly 7 asked the Council of Ministers 8 ("Ministers") to de-
termine whether any existing international agreement addressed
personal privacy39 in the context of data processing.' The Min-
isters found that earlier agreements did discuss privacy issues,
but did not consider personal privacy in the context of data
processing.4' This finding led to the adoption of Resolutions
(73)2242 and (74)29.13 These Resolutions recommended that
EU Member States implement data protection measures.4
36. D. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF T-HE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 9 (3d ed. 1982). The COE consists of a Consultive Assembly
comprised of parliamentary delegates from each of the COE Member States, a Commit-
tee of Ministers, and a Secretariat. Id.; see Pearson, supra note 5, at 29 n.1 (explaining
that COE is intergovernmental body within EU created in 1948 to promote unification
among European nations); BERMANN, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that COE is comprised
of twenty-six Member States).
37. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining that Parliamentary Assem-
bly is component of COE and consists of parliamentary delegates of Member States).
38. Id. The Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers are both compo-
nents of the COE. Id. CLvE ARCHER & FIONA BUTLER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 29 (1992): The Council of Ministers, formally titled the Coun-
cil of the European Communities, is the EU's legislative, decision-making body. Id.
The Council of Ministers is the only EU institution whose members directly represent
national governments. RICHARD MAYNE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 17 (1968).
39. HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 2. "Privacy is a concept which applies to an individ-
ual. It is the right of an individual to decide what information (s)he wishes to share
with others and also what information (s)he is willing to accept from others." Id.
40. See Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 140 (explaining that Parliamentary
Assembly was primarily concerned with whether European Human Rights Convention
(EHRC) provided for personal privacy protection by means of modern science and
technology).
41. See NUTGER, supra note 28, at 20 (1990) (noting that European Convention on
Human Rights, adopted by COE on November 4, 1950, and International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted by United Nations on December 19, 1966, were two
international agreements that considered individual privacy rights, but not with regard
to data processing); OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, 1980 O.E.C.D. Doc C (80) 58
Final at 18, 20 I.L.M. 431 (stating that Committee's inquiry revealed that existing law
provided inadequate protection of privacy rights with regard to automated data banks).
42. Resolution on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-4-vis Electronic
Data Banks in the Private Sector, Res. (73)22, Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers,
224th mtg. (1973) [hereinafter Resolution (73)22].
43. Resolution on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-i-vis Electronic
Data Banks in the Public Sector, Res. (74)29, Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers,
224th mtg. (1974) [hereinafter Resolution (74)29].
44. See Resolution (73)22, supra note 42 (establishing principles of data protection
for private sector); Resolution (74)29, supra note 43 (establishing principles of data
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Following the adoption of Resolutions (73)22 and (74)29,
several EU Member States enacted data protection legislation.45
All of the national data protection laws included provisions ad-
dressing personal data security.46 These national security provi-
sions, however, mandated disparate data security require-
ments.
4 7
These provisions' conflicting requirements impeded the
ability of computer users in the European Union to transfer
computerized information across national borders. 48 EU Mem-
ber States that maintained stringent security laws often prohib-
ited data transfers to Member States possessing inadequate49
protection for the public sector). The Ministers adopted the private sector Resolution
on September 26, 1973, and the public sector Resolution on September 20, 1974. SI-
MON CHALTON & SHELAGH GASKILL, DATA PROTECTION LAw 1147 (1988). See OECD
Guidelines, supra note 31, 1980 O.E.C.D. Doc C (80) 58 Final at 19, 20 I.L.M. 431
(discussing Resolutions (73)22 and (74) 29's recommendation that COE Member States
implement measures regarding obtaining of data, quality of data, rights of individuals
to be informed about data, and data processing activities); Jongen & Vriezen, supra
note 23, at 140 (explaining that Resolutions (73)22 and (74)29 established minimum
standards of data protection).
45. See Draft Explanatory Report on the Draft Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe,
Cj-CD (80) 1, Addendum (Jan. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 299, 300 [hereinafter COE
Convention Explanatory Report] (noting that COE Member States possessed discretion
regarding method by which they implement Resolutions, and that most Member States
elected to enact legislation); Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 140 (listing Austria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden as countries that pos-
sess data protection laws, and noting that Portugal and Spain include data protection as
fundamental rights in their Constitutions).
46. E.g., NUTGER, supra note 28, at 64. Section 6 of the German personal data
processing act, the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz ("BDSG"), provides: "There is an obliga-
tion on all persons involved in processing data within the scope of the BDSG to imple-
ment technical and organizational measures to ensure that the act is complied with."
Id. Section 29 of the French data processing act, the Loi relative i l'informatique, aux
fichiers et aux libert~s ("LIFL"), states: "Any person processing personal data or order-
ing such processing thereby shall undertake, vis-i-vis the persons concerned to see that
all necessary precautions are taken to protect the data and in particular to prevent these
from being distorted, damaged or disclosed to unauthorized third parties." Id. at 95.
47. Id. at 64.
The German legislator has chosen not to tie the measures to be taken to a
particular state of technology. Data security is seen as a process that is [ame-
nable] to improvement with the result that the latest state-of-the-art technol-
ogy can be viewed as the point of departure.
Id. By contrast, the LIFL does not make any reference to the state of technology to be
implemented. Id. at 95.
48. Council Adopts Common Position on Protection of Personal Data Directive, supra note
34.
49. See Modification of the Commission's Proposal on Data Protection, INFORMATION, Oct.
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data security requirements. 50 The French government, for in-
stance, prohibited the Italian car maker, Fiat, from transferring
employee data from the company's French subsidiary to its head-
quarters in Italy.5 1 The French Government prohibited the
transfer because it considered Italian data security requirements
inadequate.52
2. International Initiatives
While preparing Resolutions 73(22) and 74(29), the Minis-
ters advised the COE that the national data protection laws re-
quired reinforcement from a binding, international data protec-
tion agreement.5 3 In 1976, pursuant to the Ministers' recom-
mendation, the COE instructed the Ministers to prepare a
Convention 54 ("COE Convention") on personal data protec-
tion.15 In 1980, the Ministers completed a draft of the Conven-
tion,56 and, in 1981, the final version of the Convention opened
23, 1992 available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file (explaining that some EU
Member States do not possess data protection legislation); DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRI-
VACy viii (Dennis Campbell &Joy Fisher eds., 1994). Belgium did not adopt data pro-
tection legislation until 1992. Id.
50. Council Adapts Common Position on Protection of Personal Data Directive, supra note
34; see Emma Tucker, EU States Harmonise on Data Protection, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at
1, 14 (stating that varying data protection laws limit cross-border provision of financial
products, including mortgages and life insurance policies); COE Convention Explana-
tory Report, supra note 45, at 302. Even if two Member States possess similar data pro-
tection laws, problems may arise regarding which nation has jurisdiction and which
national law applies. Id.
51. Banks Oppose EC Plans to Protect Personal Privacy, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, News File.
52. Id. The French and Italian governments reached a compromise after Fiat
guaranteed that it would protect the transferred information. Id.
53. Alexander D. Roth, Introduction to Convention for the Protection of Individu-
als with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 19 I.L.M. 282 (1980) [herein-
after COE Introductory Note]. The Ministers suggested that the COE create a binding
international agreement following the enactment of the national laws. Id.; see BER-
MANN, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that although COE does not possess legislative power,
it produces international documents on variety of subjects adopted by COE Member
States).
54. CHALTON & GAsiuLL, supra note 44, at 1147. The COE Convention established
basic data protection principles. Id. The COE Convention is binding upon its signato-
ries, who are obligated to incorporate the COE Convention's principles into their na-
tional laws. Id.
55. COE Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 45, at 302. The Ministers
developed the Convention in collaboration with the OECD. Id.
56. CHALTON & GASKILL, supra note 44, at 1147. The Ministers considered two
models for the COE Convention. Id.
The first was based on reciprocity: data processing in Country A which related
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for signature.57 The COE Convention's data security provision
required the implementation of security measures incorporating
state of the art technology.58
In 1978, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 9 ("OECD") also attempted to eliminate conflicts
among the national data protection laws.6" The OECD organ-
ized a Group of Experts on Transborder Data Barriers and Pri-
vacy Protection61 ("Transborder Experts") to formulate a set of
international data protection guidelines ("OECD Guidelines").6
to individuals living in Country B would be required to be carried out accord-
ing to the laws of Country A and vice versa. The second possibility was the
promulgation of data protection principles common to all party states.
Id. The Ministers chose to implement the second option. Id.57. Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 140. The Committee of Ministers ap-
proved the COE Convention on December 17, 1980. Id. The Convention opened for
signature on January 28, 1981. Id. COE Convention, supra note 33, Europ. T.S. No.
108, at 11, 19 I.L.M. at 299. Austria, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have ratified
the Convention. Id. Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Turkey have signed but not ratified the Convention. Id. Finland, Liechtenstein,
Malta, San Marino, and Switzerland have not signed the Convention. Id.
58. COE Convention, supra note 33, Europ. T.S. No. 108, at 4, 20 I.L.M. at 317.
Article 7 provides that: "[Aippropriate security measures shall be taken for the protec-
tion of personal data stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorised
destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorised access, alteration or dis-
semination." Id. The Convention requires that data security measures be based on the
current state of the art in the field of data security methods and techniques. COE
Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 45, at 310.
59. BERMANN, supra note 6, at 4. The OECD was originally named the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation ("OEEC"). Id. In 1948, the Marshall Plan's
recipient nations created the OEEC in order to facilitate the administration of the Mar-
shall Plan. Id. In 1960, Canada and the United States became members of the OEEC,
at which time it was renamed the OECD. Id. The OECD is primarily concerned with
instituting policies regarding the European economy. Id.
60. OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, at 15, 20 I.L.M. at 422.
61. Id. Justice Michael Kirby, Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion, chaired the Group of Experts on Transborder Data Barriers and Privacy Protec-
tion ("Expert Group"). Id. at 5, 20 I.L.M. at 426. A Symposium, held in Vienna in
1977, supplied the Expert Group with the information necessary to formulate a set of
data protection guidelines. Id. at 19, 20 I.L.M. at 444. The Symposium provided opin-
ions from a variety of sectors, including government, industry, and users of interna-
tional communication networks. Id.
62. Id. at 15, 20 I.L.M. at 422. The OECD Guidelines consisted of eight principles,
all intending to facilitate the protection of data processing. Id. at 15, 20 I.L.M. at 430.
These principles address: limitations on collection, data quality, purpose specification,
use limitation, openness, individual participation, accountability, and security safe-
guards. Id. at 10-11, 20 I.L.M. at 426; see Hon. Justice Michael Kirby, Legal Aspects of
Transborder Data Flows, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 233, 233 (1991) (noting OECD Guidelines
are voluntary because OECD does not possess enforcement power).
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On September 23, 1980, OECD Member States6" adopted the
OECD Guidelines, which became the European Union's founda-
don for uniformity in the protection of personal data.64 The
OECD Guidelines included a provision devoted to personal data
security.65 This provision recommended that computer users
implement "reasonable safeguards" to protect personal data."6
The security provisions in both the COE Convention and
the OECD Guidelines failed to harmonize national personal
data security requirements.67 These international provisions did
not replace existing national data security requirements.68
Rather, Member States altered national security provisions to in-
clude the general data security objectives outlined in the COE
Convention and the OECD Guidelines. 69 Members States inde-
pendently determined which security measures satisfied the
COE and the OECD objectives. 70 Discrepancies among national
data security laws persisted because Member States did not re-
quire the implementation of identical security measures to
63. OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, at 2, 20 I.L.M. 422. OECD Member States
include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
64. Kirby, supra note 62, at 233.
65. OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, at 10, 20 I.L.M. at 425. The Security Safe-
guards Principle reads: "Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safe-
guards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification
or disclosure of data." Id.
66. Id. at 31, 20 I.L.M. at 444. The OECD Guideline's Explanatory Memorandum
defines "reasonable safeguards" as:
Such safeguards include physical measures (locked doors and identification
cards, for instance), organisational measures (such as authority levels with re-
gard to access to data) and, particularly in computer systems, informational
measures (such as enciphering and threat monitoring of unusual activities and
responses to them).
Id.
67. Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 150; see Amelia Torres, Belgium Speeds Up
Work on Plans to Protect Privacy, REuTERs, Sept. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ARCNWS file (reporting that COE and European Commission officials believe
that COE Convention does not allow for free movement of data in single market, nor
does it possess legal provisions to solve conflicts).
68. COE Introductory Note, supra note 53, 19 I.L.M. at 282 (1980).
69. CHALTON & GAsiuLL, supra note 44, at 1147.
70. Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 141. The manner in which the signatories
to the COE Convention implement the basic principles of the COE Convention is left
to their discretion. Id. See also CHALTON & GAsmiLL, supra note 44, at 1147 (examining
recommended OECD Guidelines).
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achieve the general objectives outlined in the COE Convention
and the OECD Guidelines.7
3. Article 17
In 1990, the Commission of the European Communities
72
("Commission") responded to persisting disparities73 among na-
tional data protection laws, such as incompatible data security
requirements, by issuing a comprehensive data protection pro-
posal ("1990 Proposal") .7 The 1990 Proposal, however, encoun-
tered severe criticism from various sectors within the European
Union. 75 Opposition to the 1990 Proposal prompted drafters to
71. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing various methods adopted
by EU Member States to achieve general objectives outlined in COE Convention and
OECD Guidelines).
72. ARCHER & BUTLER, supra note 38, at 24. Seventeen Commissioners serve on
the Commission. Id. The Commissioners do not advocate their national interest. Id.
The Commission proposes legislation, while the Council of Ministers decides whether
to implement the Commission's proposed legislation. Id. at 29. The Commission was
kept apprised of the COE's activities while the COE prepared the COE Convention. Id.
The Commission supervised the harmonization of national legislation regarding the
data security problems of individual residents of the Member States. Id.
73. SeeJongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 150 (explaining that EU legislation is
justified only when national laws are not harmonized); Commission of the European
Communities: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament Pursuant to
the Second Subparagraph of Article 189 B (2) of the EC Treaty, SEC (95) 303 Final at 1 (Feb.
1995) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament] (con-
cluding that harmonization of data security laws is necessary to address disparities
among national laws, and to satisfy data-exchange requirements imposed by completion
of internal market).
74. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in
Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, COM (90) 314 Final (Sept. 1990) [herein-
after 1990 Proposal]; Jongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 150. In 1982, the COE
adopted a resolution recommending that the European Community formulate a direc-
tive regarding personal data in the anticipation of the COE Convention's inability to
foster uniformity among national data protection legislation. Id. The 1990 Proposal is
the product of this recommendation. Id.; see EU Council Approves Standards for the Protec-
tions of Data Privacy, supra note 10 (reporting that 1990 Proposal intended to provide
regulatory framework enabling free movement of personal data across EU borders).
75. Louella Miles, Feeling the Draft, MARKETING, May 30, 1991, at 16. Newspapers
criticized the 1990 Proposal for creating severe restrictions on indirect and classified
advertising. Id. Computer manufactures criticized the 1990 Proposal for encouraging
manual manipulation of data. Id. The British Bankers' Association criticized the 1990
Proposal, stating that it could undermine the world's cash flow. Id.; see Andrew Hill,
Brussels Acts to Dispel Fears Over Data Processing, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24-25, 1992, at A2 (ex-
plaining that human rights organizations raised objections to 1990 Proposal, claiming
that directive would provide European governments with carte blanche regarding per-
sonal data); Banks Oppose EC Plans to Protect Personal Privacy, supra note 51 (stating that
EC Banking Federation criticized 1990 Proposal as poorly designed for responsible
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amend76 the original version and create a more lenient and less
restrictive directive.77 The drafters' efforts ultimately resulted in
the 1995 Directive. 8
Article 17 bestows upon the data controller responsibility
for ensuring the security of processed personal data. 79 Article 17
mandates that data controllers accomplish this task by imple-
menting security measures that incorporate state of the art tech-
nology.8" Article 17, however, neglects to specify those technolo-
gies that satisfy this state of the art standard." Each EU Member
State must independently determine which security measures
satisfy Article 17's state of the art standard. 2 All EU Member
States, however, must obey the criteria outlined in Article 17.83
Because all EU Member States require data controllers to obey
Article 17's state of the art standard, incompatible data security
requirements will be eliminated, thereby facilitating data flow
across national borders.8 4
lending, efficiency of payment systems, and combating financial fraud); Jongen &
Vriezen, supra note 23, at 151 (characterizing 1990 Proposal as extreme and bureau-
cratic; favoring protection of privacy at expense of public policy objectives, including
freedom of information).
76. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, supra note 73.
Two of the most significant amendments are the exclusion of the distinction between
data protection rules in the public and private sector, and the procedures regarding
supervisory authority. Id.; see 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, O.J. L 93/01
(1995) (presenting 1995 Directive).
77. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, O.J. L 93/01 (1995).
78. Council Adopts Common Position on Protection of Personal Data Directive, supra note
34. The 1995 Directive is intended to act as a regulatory measure that will guarantee
the free movement of personal data. Id.
79. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), (2), O.J. L 93/01, at 12
(1995). The responsibility for ensuring security of processed personal data also applies
to other persons who participate in personal data processing. Id.
80. Id.; see supra note 13 (discussing state of art).
81. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17, O.J. L 93/01, at 12 (1995).
82. EU/Internal Market: Council Agreement on Data Protection Directive Confirmed (With
Abstention by United Kingdom), Even Though the Common Position Must Be Verified in Swedish
and Finnish, EUROPE, Feb. 10, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter EU/Internal Market]; 1995 Directive
No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17, O.J. L 93/01, at 12 (1995). "Having regard to the state
of the art and the costs of their implementation, such measures shall ensure a level of
security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of the
data to be protected." Id.
83. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17, O.J. L 93/01, at 12 (1995); see
EU/lInternal Market, supra note 82, at 6 (stating that EU Member States must transpose
criteria outlined in Article 17 into national data protection laws within three years fol-
lowing adoption of 1995 Directive).
84. SeeJongen & Vriezen, supra note 23, at 139 (noting that EU data security law
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B. U.S. Encryption Technology
The U.S. Government seeks to ensure personal data security
through the development of encryption technology.8 5 In 1977,
the U.S. Government endorsed the Data Encryption Standard 6
("DES") as a government-sponsored encryption standard.8 7
Shortly thereafter, scientists developed Rivest-Shamir-Adelman 88
("RSA"), an alternative encryption device to DES. 9 Although
DES and RSA enjoy international popularity among members of
the private sector,90 the U.S. Government suspects that wide-
spread availability of DES and RSA endangers national security.9'
In 1993, in an attempt to alleviate national security concerns, the
U.S. Government adopted EES as a government-sponsored en-
cryption standard.92
1. The Evolution of Encryption Technology in the
United States
For centuries, military leaders, diplomats, and spies have
practiced the art of cryptography93 to prevent enemies from ob-
taining confidential94 information.95 Cryptography consists of
will harmonize national data security laws, thereby eliminating need to restrict data
flows for privacy protection reasons).
85. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing EES as most recently
released U.S. encryption standard).
86. OTA, supra note 15, at 121. DES, an encryption device, was the first govern-
ment-sponsored encryption product. Id.
87. Id.
88. Fallows, supra note 21, at 46. Rivest-Shamir-Adelman, RSA, was developed in
1978, and is named after its inventors, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adel-
man. Id.
89. OTA, supra note 15, at 120.
90. See Rochelle Garner, Clipper's Hidden Agenda, OPEN COMPUTING, Aug. 1994, at
54 (reporting that international finance and banking communities encrypt data with
DES and RSA encryption systems); Eric Hirschhorn & David Payton, Uncle Sam's Decoder
Ring, WASH. Posr, June 25, 1992, at A23 (reporting that encryption is routine business
precaution); Stewart A. Baker, Don't Worry Be Happy, in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 295,
299 (LanceJ. Hoffman ed., 1994) (noting that development of encryption technology
is expensive because of time-consuming process of testing strength of algorithm for
bugs and weaknesses).
91. See James Daly, Security Pros, Clinton Clash over Encyption Standards, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Jan. 1994, at 79 (stating that U.S. Government fears RSA and DES may
prevent U.S. security agencies from intercepting non-U.S. communications).
92. OTA, supra note 15, at 117.
93. See HOFMAN, supra note 4, at 42 (explaining "cryptography" is Greek word for
"hidden writing").
94. See OTA, supra note 15, at 112 (defining confidentiality as secrecy of contents).
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two components: encryption96 and decryption.97 Encryption in-
volves converting information into an unreadable form, while
decryption operates to reconvert the information into an under-
standable language.9 8 Encryption and decryption are accom-
plished using mathematical algorithms99 that convert and recon-
vert information. °° Although algorithms do not prevent access
to the message, they do prevent unauthorized persons from un-
derstanding the message's contents.101 The more complex the
algorithm, the more difficult it is to determine the algorithm's
formula and decrypt the information.10 2
Whereas algorithms in manual cryptosystems code informa-
tion with simple formulas, computer-based algorithms code com-
puterized data with keys.1 0 3 A key consists of a series of bits.104
"Confidentiality is a concept which applies to data. It is the status accorded to data
which has been agreed upon between the person or organization furnishing the data
and the organization receiving it and which describes the degree of protection to be
provided." HorrFr, supra note 4, at 2.
95. See HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 42-43 (stating that Spartans in fifth century B.C.
and Venice's ruling body in sixteenth century, both employed cryptographic tech-
niques to conceal messages from adversaries); Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 182 (ex-
plaining thatJulius Caesar protected messages by substituting every letter in word with
letter that is three letters later in alphabet). To illustrate Caesar's code, the string:
ZHBQHHGBPRUHBVQRZBIRUBEHWWHUBVNLLQJ
is the encrypted version of the message:
WE NEED MORE SNOW FOR BETTER SKIING
HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 43.
96. OTA, supra note 15, at 112. The encrypted, unintelligible version of the infor-
mation is often referred to as ciphertext. Id.
97. Id. The decrypted, understandable version of the information is often referred
to as plaintext. Id.
98. See Cryptography Policy, supra note 3, at 109 (describing encryption and decryp-
tion as inverse operations).
99. BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER: THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC Poucv DEBATE 14 (Lance J.
Hoffman ed., 1994) [hereinafter BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER]. Mathematical algorithms
comprise the technique or rules selected for encryption. Id. The algorithm selected
determines "how simple or how complex the process of transformation will be." Id.; see
John Markoff, BigBrother and the Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1993, at DI [hereinaf-
ter Big Brother and the Computer Age] (defining algorithm as mathematical formula on
which encoding system is based).
100. See OTA, supra note 15, at 113 (defining algorithm as technique by which
original input is transformed into form that is unintelligible without knowledge of se-
cret information).
101. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 182. Algorithms scramble the messages. Id.
102. See OTA, supra note 15, at 112 (stating that strength of algorithm depends
upon number of steps, storage, and time necessary to break code and read encrypted
message, without prior knowledge of formula on which algorithm is based).
103. BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 14. A key is a secret value that
acts as a password. Id. The key is incorporated into the algorithm to convert the infor-
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Each bit is comprised of a string of zeros and ones. 1 5 A com-
puter user must input the appropriate key into the algorithm to
encrypt and decrypt data.0 6 The strength of the algorithm and
the amount of bits included in the key'0 7 determine the amount
of protection afforded by the encryption technology em-
ployed.10 8
Computer database networks that lack effective security de-
vices are susceptible to unauthorized intrusion, 0 9 intercep-
tion," 0 and misuse."' Unauthorized acquisition of personal
data, which generally occurs for pecuniary reasons"a2 or as a
mation into an unreadable form. Cyptography Policy, supra note 3, at 109. The al-
gorithm and the key are collectively titled a cryptosystem. OTA, supra note 15, at 113.
Keys, which are generated randomly, encrypt and decrypt data. Daniel Pearl, Encryption
- Software Plan Presented Using 'Keys" Held by Escrow Agents, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1995, at
A .
104. Pearl, supra note 103, at A7.
105. The Impact on America's Software Industry of Current U.S. Government Munitions
Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993).
106. Id.
107. Id. "Longer key lengths mean more possible keys for an intruder to try and
thus imply greater security." Id.
108. Id.; BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY' PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS AND
SOURCE CODE IN C 129 (1994); Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryp-
tion Software: Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to
Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469 n.36 (1994). If a key
possesses two bits, four possible key combinations exist: 00, 01, 10, 11. Id. If a key
possesses three bits, eight possible key combinations exist. Id.
109. Michael D. Scott, United States, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACy 487, 501
(Dennis Campbell &Joy Fisher eds., 1994). "Intrusion" is "the wrongful entering upon,
seizing or taking possession of another's property." Id. Examples of computer-related
intrusions include: unauthorized access to individual databases, unauthorized removal
of data from computer systems, and unauthorized interception of data transmissions.
Id.
110. See id. at 502 (presenting interception as equivalent to eavesdropping, and
noting that examples of interception include: unauthorized access of computer-based
data by person at computer site, unauthorized access of computer-based data from re-
mote location, and interception of information communicated between computer and
terminal or another computer).
111. See id. at 503 (explaining that information is misused when it was revealed for
specific purpose and individual or entity to whom information was revealed uses it for
unauthorized purpose).
112. Jerome Lobel, Third Decade of Concern, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 8, 1982, at 32.
For example, access to banks' computer systems facilitates wire fraud and theft from
computerized accounts. Id. Additionally, access to welfare agencies' computer systems
allows people to illegally receive welfare payments. Id. A study released by the National
Center for Computer Crime Data found that theft of money and services accounts for
70% of computer crimes. Michael Alexander, Hacker Stereotypes Changing, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Apr. 3, 1989, at 101.
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game or challenge, 113 creates potentially devastating conse-
quences1 4 both to society at large and to the individual whose
personal data is involved. 5 Computer-based encryption tech-
nology minimizes the likelihood of unauthorized acquisition.
11 6
2. Entities Responsible for U.S. Encryption Standards
The U.S. Government segregates computerized data into
two categories for purposes of determining the governmental
entity responsible for protecting the data. 7 The National Se-
curity Agency' ("NSA") controls one category, classified
data. 1 9 The Brooks Act12 0 authorizes the U.S. Department of
Commerce to control and create processing standards for the
other category, "unclassified but sensitive" data.1 2 ' The U.S. De-
113. TIME LIFE BOOKS, COMPUTER SECURITY 19 (Understanding Computers No. 8,
1986) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS]. A high school student broke into a
university computer system and destroyed data "just for the fun of it." Id. In 1983,
approximately twelve youths calling themselves the 414s, after the Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin area code, broke into more than sixty computer networks. JEROME LOBEL, FOILING
THE SYSTEM BREAKERS 1 (1986).
114. See Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, Jan. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NPR File [hereinafter Weekend Edition] (identifying computerized theft,
industrial espionage, electronic vandalism, and forgery as potential consequences of
unprotected personal data).
115. See GEOFF L. SIMMONS, PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE 27 (1982) (explaining
that disclosure of personal data may affect person's employment prospects, marriage,
treatment in courts, credit ratings, and public reputation).
116. See Lobel, supra note 112, at 33 (explaining that encryption protects data
while data is processed).
117. OTA, supra note 15, at 141.
118. National Security Act of 1947, Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 C.F.R. 59941
(1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and in 61 Stat. 495
(1947). The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the creation of the National Se-
curity Agency ("NSA"). Id. The U.S. Department of Defense oversees and controls
NSA activities. Id. The NSA is concerned primarily with intelligence operations. Id.
119. BNA, COMPUTER DATA SECURITY- A LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LLABItxry,
Loss PREVENTION, AND CRIMINAL & CIVIL REMEDIES 32 (1989) [hereinafter COMPUTER
DATA SECURITY]. The Computer Security Act of 1987 ("Computer Security Act") de-
fines "classified data" as "information which has been specifically authorized under cri-
teria established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy." Computer Security Act of 1987, 15
U.S.C. § 278g-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Computer Security Act].
120. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, § 111, 79
Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1982)). The Brooks Act
of 1965 authorized the Commerce Department to create computer systems research
programs, and to formulate federal computer security standards for "unclassified but
sensitive" information. OTA, supra note 15, at 133.
121. OTA, supra note 15, at 135. Computer Security Act, 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3. The
Computer Security Act defines "sensitive information" as:
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partment of Commerce delegates this duty to the National Insti-
tute of Science and Technology ("NIST").122 NIST develops
Federal Information Processing Standards ("FIPS") .123 FIPS in-
fluence U.S. Government agencies' decisions regarding which
encryption technology to employ. 12 4 FIPS also facilitate the ex-
change of encrypted data among computer users. 12 5
The Computer Security Act of 1987126 ("Computer Security
Act") reinforces and clarifies NIST and NSA duties regarding
data security.127 The Computer Security Act charges the NSA
with the responsibility of protecting classified data processed on
computer networks.' 28 The Computer Security Act further man-
dates that NIST must create all U.S. security standards and
guidelines for sensitive but unclassified computer systems.
12 9
The Computer Security Act provides that NIST may receive tech-
nical assistance from the NSA, but the NSA must only assist NIST
in an advisory capacity.' NIST possesses final authority regard-
ing the development of standards and guidelines for sensitive
but unclassified data.1
3
[A]ny information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification
of which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal
programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled... but which has
not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive or-
der or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy."
Id.
122. OTA, supra note 15, at 136. The National Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy ("NIST") was originally named the National Bureau of Standards ("NBS"). Id. NBS
established a program for computer security in 1973. Id. The NBS security program
led to the adoption of DES as a Federal Information Processing Standard ("FIPS"). Id.
Currently, FIPS are created by the NIST Computer Systems Laboratory. Id.
123. Id. at 129. NIST has published dozens of FIPS. Id. at 136. The most recently
published FIPS is EES. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Computer Security Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2789-3. COMPUTER DATA SECUiRrY, supra
note 119, at 35. Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan) introduced The Computer Security Act
on Jan. 6, 1987 as H. R. Res. 145. Id.
127. Computer Security Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2789-3; OTA, supra note 15, at 138.
128. OTA, supra note 15, at 138.
129. See Computer Security Act, 15 U.S.C. at § 3(3) (explaining that NIST must
also help private sector organizations apply results of NIST computer security activi-
ties).
130. Id. at § 2(b)(1); see OTA, supra note 15, at 146 (explaining that NIST may
consult NSA computer system technical security guidelines to extent that guidelines are
consistent with NIST requirements).
131. OTA, supra note 15, at 145.
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3. DES
The U.S. Government adopted DES as the first federal en-
cryption standard to protect sensitive but unclassified computer-
ized data. 32 In January 1977, NIST published DES as a FIPS,'33
and the U.S. Government endorsed DES as the official Govern-
ment standard in July of the same year.13 4 When the U.S. Gov-
ernment initially endorsed DES, encryption experts considered
the DES algorithm unbreakable.13 5  The National Bureau of
Standards13 6 ("NBS"), however, anticipated that future techno-
logical advancements might diminish DES's ability to provide ad-
equate security.' 3 7 NIST, therefore, required that the effective-
ness of DES be evaluated every five years.13 8  Despite growing
concern regarding DES's ability to protect computerized infor-
mation,1 3 9 in 1993, NIST reaffirmed DES as the national stan-
dard until its reevaluation in 1998.140
132. Id. at 121. Scientists working for the International Business Machines Corpo-
ration developed DES specifically to protect information considered unclassified but
sensitive to U.S. national security. Id.
133. Id. at 136. NBS, under the authority of the Brooks Act of 1965, adopted DES
as a FIPS. Id.
134. Id. at 121.
135. Daly, supra note 91, at 79.
136. See supra note 122 (discussing creation and function of NBS).
137. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STAN-
DARDS PUBLICATION, 46-1: DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 1, 4 (1977). Modern computers
are able to launch "brute attacks" on DES in attempts to break DES code. Id. The
more modem the computer used to launch the attack, the faster it can break DES
codes. Id.
138. Id. NIST conducts the evaluations of DES. Id.
139. Ciyptography Policy, supra note 3, at 110. "[T]he security of DES in the future
is worrisome to some scientists, who contend that advances in technology will soon
make it possible to break DES by 'brute force,' using a powerful computer to try every
possible combination of keys until the correct key is discovered." Id.
140. See BuILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 38 (stating that although NIST
reaffirmed DES in 1993, NIST indicates that it might not reaffirm DES as national stan-
dard in 1998). The acting director of NIST, Dennis Branstead, stated that:
Last year, NIST formally solicited comments on the recertification of DES.
After reviewing those comments, and the other technical inputs that I have
received, I plan to recommend to the Secretary of Commerce that he recertify
DES for another five years. I also plan to suggest to the Secretary that when we
announce the recertification we state our intention to consider alternatives to
it over the next five years. By putting that announcement on the table, we
hope to give people an opportunity to comment on orderly technological
transitions. In the meantime, we need to consider the large installed base of
systems that rely upon this proven standard.
SCHNEIER, supra note 108, at 223.
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The DES algorithm, which possesses a 56-bit key,14 1 is a sin-
gle key'42 encryption algorithm. 43 In a single key system, every
computer user participating in the particular communication
employs the same key to encrypt and decrypt the data.'44 The
authorized users must protect the key because any computer
user who obtains the key used to encrypt the data can employ
the same key to decrypt the data. 145 Because the degree of se-
curity afforded by DES depends upon how well the authorized
computer users protect the key, 46 the possibility of lost, stolen,
and counterfeit keys constitutes an inherent vulnerability in the
DES system.
147
4. RSA
In 1977, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adelman
developed RSA, an alternative encryption device to DES. 14 8
Although the U.S. Government never endorsed RSA as a govern-
ment-sponsored encryption standard, 149 the system enjoys inter-
national popularity. 50 Banks in Europe and Australia employ
141. UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS, supra note 113, at 19. The algorithm breaks
down information into sections of eight characters and then encrypts each section us-
ing a particular key. Id. DES's 56 bit key possesses 1017 possible values. Kurt Kleiner,
Cracking into the World of Whispers, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 14. See supra note
104 (discussing components and function of keys and bits).
142. See BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 19 (explaining that single key
is also referred to as private key, symmetric key, or secret key).
143. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 184.
144. BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 19. If the key to encrypt the data
is 0101, then the key to decrypt the data is also 0101. Id.
145. MORRIE GASSER, BUILDING A SECURE COMPUTER SYSTEM 258 (1988). "Because
keys get stale after repeated use [the greater the amount of information encrypted with
a given key, the easier it is to figure out the key and break the code], it is important to
change keys periodically [an interval called a cryptoperiod]." Id.
146. BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 19.
147. Fallows, supra note 21, at 46. "The need for two or more people to agree
ahead of time on a key created problems that have been the stuff of spy novels and war
histories for hundreds of years." Id.
148. OTA, supra note 15, at 220. In 1982, the inventors of RSA, Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adelman, formed RSA Data Security, Inc., and obtained an exclu-
sive license for their invention from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which
had been assigned rights to the invention. Id.
149. Id. NIST claims that its desire to issue royalty-free FIPS prevented it from
endorsing RSA as a government-sponsored encryption standard because RSA was de-
veloped by members of the private sector. Id.
150. Murray Slovick, The Big Brother Chip, POPULAR MECHANICS, Sept. 1994, at 116,
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RSA,15 1 and over four million copies of RSA exist worldwide.152
The RSA system eliminates the need for computer users
who exchange encrypted information to share secret keys,' 5 3 the
primary drawback associated with the DES single key system.154
The RSA algorithm accomplishes this task by employing two
mathematically related keys to encrypt and decrypt computer-
ized data.' 55 RSA's two key system 156 involves a private key and a
public key.' 57 To create the keys, a computer user must choose
two prime numbers. 58 The public key, which equals the prod-
uct of two 155-digit prime numbers, 159 may be used by any com-
puter user to encrypt data.160 The encrypted data, however, can
only be decrypted by the holder of the private key, which con-
sists of the original prime numbers.' 61 Although the numbers
employed to create the private key, theoretically, could be deter-
mined, the process would take hundreds of years. 162
151. Garner, supra note 90, at 55.
152. Slovick, supra note 150, at 117.
153. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 184.
154. Fallows, supra note 21, at 46. The inventors of RSA developed the encryption
device based on the ideas included in a paper proposed by two Stanford University
scientists, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. Id. Diffie and Hellman's paper pro-
posed a cryptographic system that would eliminate the vulnerabilities associated with a
single key system. Id. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing vulnerabil-
ity associated with DES single key system).
155. See Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 183 (explaining that because two keys are
mathematically related, one key can encrypt information and other key can decrypt
information, and vice-versa).
156. See BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 99, at 19 (noting that two key system
is also referred to as asymmetric key or public key system).
157. See Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 184 (explaining that two key system allows
computer users to publish public key in directory while keeping private key private).
The two key system incorporated into RSA allows computer users to employ the system
for activities such as filing tax returns or using a credit card number for on-line shop-
ping. Slovick, supra note 150, at 117.
158. Fallows, supra note 21, at 48; see Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14 (defining prime
numbers as numbers possessing only two factors).
159. Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14.
160. Fallows, supra note 21, at 48.
161. See id. (stating that it is impossible to discern original prime number compris-
ing secret key with only knowledge of public key).
162. Id. "Finding the factors of such a 200-digit number on a modern top-speed
computer would require not milliseconds or minutes but at least several centuries. The
task is, in computer terms, "computationally infeasible." Id.; see Slovick, supra note 150,
at 117 (explaining that businesses are attracted to RSA because of system's security).
164 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:143
5. EES
The Clinton Administration released EES in April 1993163 to
protect unclassified but sensitive data.164 NIST approved EES as
a FIPS in February 1994.16 EES consists of two components, the
Clipper Chip 16 6 and the Capstone Chip.1 67 Both components of
EES are tamper-proof chips that incorporate the SKIPJACK al-
gorithm.168 All computer users participating in data communi-
cations encrypted with EES technology must possess a chip con-
taining the SKIPJACK algorithm.1 69 The sending party's chip en-
crypts the data, and the receiving party's chip decrypts the
data. 170
EES chips feature key escrow technology.1 7' This technol-
ogy allows law enforcement agencies to intercept voice and data
communications.1 72  Each EES chip possesses an identification
number 73 that constitutes the chip-unique key.' 74 Each chip-
unique key is broken into two components.' 75 Each component
of a particular key is separately escrowed. 176 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury177 holds one component of the key in escrow,
163. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7.
164. OTA, supra note 15, at 117.
165. Id.; Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7. The Commerce Secretary ap-
proved EES as a FIPS Standard. Id. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing creation and function of FIPS).
166. Fallows, supra note 21, at 48.
167. See Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14 (explaining that Clipper Chip encrypts voice
communications and Capstone Chip encrypts data communications); OTA, supra note
15, at 117 (stating that VLSI Logic produces these chips, and Mykotronx programs
these chips with algorithms and keys).
168. Dorothy Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in BUILDING IN
BIG BROTHER 111, 112 (LanceJ. Hoffman ed., 1994). SKIPJACK which was designed by
the NSA, is a single-key encryption algorithm. Id. SKIPJACK employs an 80-bit key. Id.
169. Id. at 114-15.
170. Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14.
171. Id.
172. OTA, supra note 15, at 117.
173. Fallows, supra note 21, at 48. The U.S. Government maintains a master list of
identification numbers for every EES chip sold. Id.
174. Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the House of Representatives Comm.
on Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (statement of Clinton C.
Brooks, Special Assistant to the Director, NSA) [hereinafter Brooks].
175. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in BuIWLING IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 168, at 111-12.
176. Brooks, supra note 174, at 3.
177. THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT MANUAL 1993/1994, at 492 (1994). The
Treasury Department, which was created on September 2, 1789, formulates and recom-
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and the U.S. Department of Commerce 178 holds the other com-
ponent in escrow. 179 Constructing the chip-unique key neces-
sary to decrypt the data requires the retrieval of the key's compo-
nents from both escrow agents.' °
II. U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH EES AS THE
DE FACTO U.S. ENCRYPTION STANDARD
U.S. Government efforts to establish EES as the de facto en-
cryption standard in the United States requires the promotion of
EES technology and the elimination of competing encryption
devices from the U.S. encryption market.'8 ' The successful es-
tablishment of EES as the de facto U.S. encryption standard will
be advantageous for computer users and the U.S. Govern-
ment.18 2 Computer users will enjoy the most advanced data se-
curity system available to date, 8 ' and the U.S. Government will
mends economic, financial, and tax polices. Id. The Treasury Department also acts as
the U.S. Government's financial agent and issues all U.S. coins and currency. Id.
178. Id. at 154-55. The Commerce Department was reorganized into its current
form on March 4, 1913. Id. The Commerce Department creates and administers a
variety of programs to facilitate international trade, economic growth, and technologi-
cal advancement. Id.
179. Department of Justice, Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Enctyption Announce-
ments, Feb. 4, 1994 (on file with Fordham International LawJournal) [hereinafter Key Es-
crow Announcment]. Specifically, the Commerce Department's NIST and the Treasury
Department's Automated Systems Division are the two agencies responsible for holding
the keys in escrow. Id. "The two escrow agents were chosen because of their abilities to
safeguard sensitive information, while at the same time being able to respond in a
timely fashion when wiretaps encounter encrypted communications." Id. But see Gar-
ner, supra note 90, at 54 (criticizing choice of elected agents as violation of checks and
balances system because both agencies are members of Executive Branch).
180. Denning, The US. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in BUILDrNG IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 168, at 112. Whitfield Diffie stated:
The effect is very much like that of the little key hole in the back of the combi-
nation locks used on the lockers of schoolchildren. The children open the
lock with the combinations, which is supposed to keep the other children out,
but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key.
Fallows, supra note 21, at 48-49.
181. Nina Schuyler, Bugs in the System: The FBI Wants to Monitor Traffic on the Digital
Superhighway, CAL. LAw.,July 1994, at 45, 46 (1994) (citing Marc Rotenberg, director of
Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, DC).
182. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7. "[EES] will provide Americans and
government agencies with encryption products that are more secure.., than others
readily available today-while at the same time meeting the legitimate needs of law
enforcement." Id.
183. See Brooks, supra note 174, at 4 (advocating widespread implementation of
EES technology to enable computer users to take advantage of benefits offered by this
technology).
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reap the benefit of enhanced law enforcement capabilities.
18 4
Despite these advantages, however, the successful establishment
of EES as the defacto U.S. encryption standard will also engender
economic disadvantages for international businesses and U.S.
encryption manufacturers.18 5 In response to criticisms 186 con-
cerning the disadvantages attributed to EES technology, the U.S.
Government plans to develop a proposal for an alternative en-
cryption standard.
18 7
A. US. Government Tactics
Clinton Administration officials stress that all U.S. Govern-
ment agencies and members of the private sector may imple-
ment EES on a purely voluntary basis.' 88 Allowing optional im-
plementation of EES, however, impedes the U.S. Government's
goal of establishing EES as the de facto encryption standard in
the United States.' 89 The U.S. Government aims, therefore, to
ensure voluntary implementation of EES by employing its mar-
ket influence to promote EES technology 9 ° and by manipulat-
ing export controls to eliminate competing devices from the
U.S. encryption market and to facilitate the export of EES. 191
184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing EES technology).
185. Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the House of Representatives Comm.
on Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (statement of Mr. Rohra-
bacher) [hereinafter Mr. Rohrabacher]. "[EES technology] is the wrong direction that
we shouldn't be heading to." Id.
186. John Markoff, U.S. to Urge A New Policy On Software, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 18, 1995,
at D1 [hereinafter U.S. to Urge a New Policy on Software]. "[T]echnology executives have
opposed the Government's data-scrambling policy because it restricts export of other
types of data-security systems, which is seen as an impediment to sales of American
computer products overseas." Id.
187. Id.
188. Questions and Answers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy, The
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 4, 1994, [hereinafter Questions and An-
swers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy] (on file with Fordham International
Law Journal). The U.S. Government continues to stress that it developed EES for volun-
tary use by Government agencies and the private sector. Id. But see Schuyler, supra note
181, at 45 (citing Kent Walker, assistant U.S. Attorney in San Francisco) (explaining
that there is no requirement everyone use only EES; permitting use of another encryp-
tion device in addition to EES).
189. Garner, supra note 90, at 54.
190. Id.; see Fallows, supra note 21, at 50 (discussing how U.S. Government uses
market influence to make EES defacto standard in United States).
191. See Garner, supra note 90, at 54 (speculating that U.S. Government uses EES
technology to justify maintenance of export controls).
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1. Manipulation of the U.S. Encryption Market
As the single largest purchaser of computer equipment in
the world,' 92 the U.S. Government possesses the ability to influ-
ence the U.S. encryption market by promoting widespread im-
plementation of EES technology.193  In 1994, NIST approved
EES as a FIPS.'94 This approval allows U.S. Government agen-
cies to insist that all Government purchases of computer equip-
ment include EES technology. 195 The U.S. Government's sub-
stantial buying power and its demand for EES technology forces
encryption software manufacturers who desire large Govern-
ment contracts196 to produce EES products.1 97 Large U.S. Gov-
ernment purchases of EES technology reduces the price of this
system, 98 and, in turn, promotes private sector demand for
EES.' 99 Mass production and affordable prices of EES technol-
ogy promote widespread implementation of EES.200
192. Schuyler, supra note 181, at 45-46 (citing Marc Rotenberg, Director of Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.C.). COMPUTER DATA SECURITY,
supra note 119, at 32. "The federal government spent about 1.6. percent of its fiscal
1986 budget on automated data processing equipment and services-more than 415
billion." See Fallows, supra note 21, at 50 (explaining that second only to U.S. Govern-
ment, banks and credit-card companies purchase most encryption technology).
193. NMST Announces Voluntary Escrowed Encyption Standard to Promote Secure Telecom-
munications, U.S. DEP'T oF COM. NEWS, Feb. 4, 1994, at 2.
194. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (describing purpose of FIPS).
195. NIST Announces Voluntary Escrowed Encyption Standard to Promote Secure Telecom-
munications, supra note 193. The approval of EES as a FIPS enables U.S. Government
agencies to demand that American telecommunications and computer manufacturers
include key escrow technology in all equipment purchased by the agencies. Id. If EES
had not been approved as a FIPS, the "[a]gencies would have to formally waive DES
requirements if they wanted to employ escrow encryption techniques." Id.
196. See Slovick, supra note 150, at 117 (stating that AT&T, presently only supplier
of EES technology, already received orders of 8,000 EES chips from Department of
Justice, and 20,000 chips from Department of Defense).
197. See Fallows, supra note 21, at 50 (stating that if U.S. encryption software man-
ufacturers produce key escrow technology because it is only type of encryption technol-
ogy that U.S. Government will implement, then key escrow technology will eventually
crowd out competing products in the United States).
198. See Robert Lee Hotz, Computer Code's Security Privacy Watchdogs, LA. TiMES,
Oct. 4, 1993, at Al (reporting that each Clipper Chip costs US$26).
199. John Perry Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn, in BUILDING IN BI BROTHER 307,
312 (LanceJ. Hoffman eds., 1994). "By purchasing massive numbers of [EES technol-
ogy], [the U.S. Government] intend[s] to induce an economy of scale which will make
[EES technology] cheap while the export embargo renders all competition either ex-
pensive or nonexistent." Id.
200. See Fallows, supra note 21, at 50 (arguing that EES technology will eventually
crowd out competing encryption devices).
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2. Manipulation of the U.S. Encryption Export Controls
The U.S. Government promotes the implementation of EES
technology by restricting the export of competing encryption
products, such as DES and RSA, and by facilitating the export of
EES technology.2 °1 The U.S. Government considers "strong"
2°2
encryption products, such as DES and RSA, "inherently military
in character."20  The State Department is responsible for con-
trolling the export of these products.204 All items within the
State Department's jurisdiction, including DES and RSA, appear
on the United States Munitions List ("USML") .2°5 Exporters
must obtain a munitions license to export any item included on
the USML. °6 Munitions licenses require specific approval and
must be applied for on a case-by-case basis. 20 7 These stringent
controls effectively render DES and RSA non-exportable. 20 8 En-
cryption software manufacturers' inability to export DES and
RSA has compelled many U.S. manufacturers to terminate pro-
duction of these products. 20 9 This decrease in the production of
201. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (stating that U.S. Government
manipulates U.S. encryption export controls to promote widespread implementation of
EES).
202. SCHNEIER, supra note 108, at 7. "An algorithm is considered computationally
.. strong, if it cannot be broken with available (current or future) resources. Exactly
what constitutes 'available resources' is open to interpretation." Id.; see OTA, supra
note 15, at 156 n.135 (defining "strong" encryption as encryption systems that possess
1,024 bit keys and provide same degree of security as DES and RSA).
203. OTA, supra note 15, at 151.
204. Id. Specifically, the Office of Defense Controls, a component of the State
Department, administers the export controls for items considered "inherently military
in character." Id.
205. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); OTA, supra note 15, at 151.
206. OTA, supra note 15, at 151.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 156. In 1992, the U.S. Government modified encryption export con-
trols. Id. at 156-57. The 1992 modification relaxed controls for encryption systems
possessing moderate encryption capabilities. Id. at 156. Systems with moderate encryp-
tion capabilities, such as RC2 and RC4, possess 40-bit keys. Id. at 156-57. This modifica-
tion did not affect stringent controls on DES and RSA because these encryption devices
possess strong encryption capabilities. Id. at 157.
209. OTA, supra note 15, at 157. Responding to the 1992 modification of encryp-
tion export controls, financially stable U.S.' encryption software manufacturers produce
two versions of encryption systems, strong versions that are eligible for sale in the
United States and versions With moderate encryption capabilities for sale in non-U.S.
nations. Id. U.S. computer software firms that do not possess the economic resources
to manufacture two versions of each encryption system, however, only manufacture
moderately secure encryption systems that qualify for sale in both the United States and
non-U.S. destinations. Id.; Weekend Edition, supra note 114 (quoting reporter, Daniel
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DES and RSA reduces their availability in the U.S. encryption
market.2 10
The U.S Government defends stringent export controls on
DES and RSA with claims that international availability of these
strong encryption devices will endanger U.S. national security.21'
Despite stringent controls regulating the export of these encryp-
tion devices, commentators argue that the strongest encryption
system available, EES, may be freely exported.2 2 Governmental
permission to export EES technology, in conjunction with the
virtual embargo 213 on DES and RSA, suggests that the U.S. Gov-
ernment is manipulating export controls in an effort to establish
EES as the de facto encryption standard in the United States. 214
B. Potential Advantages of EES
Widespread implementation of EES technology will benefit
computer users and the U.S. Government. 5 The U.S. Govern-
ment maintains that computer users who employ EES technol-
Hinerfeld). "[A]Ithough numerous companies such as Apple, Microsoft and IBM have
licensed RSA's cryptographic software for an array of hew products, they must use it in a
weakened form." Id.; see Fallows, supra note 21, at 49 (noting that production of two
versions of all equipment is costly and complicated).
210. See Weekend Edition, supra note 114 (concluding that decreased availability of
strong encryption devices in United States shortchanges domestic computer users).
DOMINICK SALVATORE, MICROECONOMics 47 (2d ed. 1994). "[A]n increase in supply...
results in... higher.., quantity. A decrease in supply has the opposite effect." Id.
211. Encryption-Export Control Reform, U.S. Department of State, Feb. 4, 1994 (state-
ment of Dr. Martha Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military
Affairs). "The President has determined that vital U.S. national security and law en-
forcement interests compel maintaining appropriate control of encryption." Id.
212. Brooks, supra note 174, at 5-6. "[T]he Administration agreed at the urging of
industry that key escrow encryption products would be exportable." Id. at 6.
213. OTA, supra note 15, at 157. In order to export any item on the USML, in-
cluding DES and RSA, a munitions license must be obtained as well as specific approval
for the item's export, which is granted on a case-by-case basis. Id. The export of USML
products is strictly regulated and licenses are difficult to obtain. Id.
214. Garner, supra note 90, at 54. But see OTA, supra note 15, at 159.
Our announcement regarding the exportability of key escrow encryption
products has caused some to assert that the Administration is permitting the
export of key escrow products while controlling competing products in order
to force manufacturers to adopt key escrow technology. These are arguments
without foundation ... we are not using or intending to use export controls to
force vendors to adopt key escrow technology.
Id.
215. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (discussing how widespread
implementation of EES will provide advantages to computer users).
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ogy possess unrivaled data security.216 Additionally, the key es-
crow technology incorporated into EES enhances U.S. Govern-
ment law enforcement capabilities by allowing Government
agencies to intercept crime-related data communications.217
1. Advanced Data Security
The Clinton Administration asserts that EES technology of-
fers computer users the most advanced data security currently
available on the international encryption market.218 Although
the U.S. Government refuses to publicly divulge information re-
garding SKIPJACK, the mathematical algorithm incorporated
into EES technology,2 19 the NSA and NIST employed encryp-
tion experts220 to independently evaluate the algorithm's secur-
ity.221 These experts issued a joint report that discussed the
SKIPJACK algorithm.22
The experts, who based their evaluation of SKIPJACK's se-
curity on the algorithm's ability to overcome "brute force at-
tacks, '1 21 concluded that the secrecy surrounding SKIPJACK
216. Questions and Answers About the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy, supra
note 188. " [EES technology] will provide Americans with encryption products that are
more secure ... than others readily available today." Id.
217. Statement of the Vice President, The White House Office of the Vice President,
Feb. 4, 1994 (on file with Fordham International Law Journal).
218. See Questions and Answers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy,
supra note 188 (noting that EES technology guarantees most advanced security avail-
able to date).
219. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 168, at 112. "The algorithm was designed by the National Security
Agency and is classified in order to prevent someone from implementing it in software
or hardware without providing the law enforcement access feature, thereby taking ad-
vantage of the government's strong algorithm while rendering encrypted communica-
tions immune from lawful government surveillance." Id.
220. Ernest F. Brickell, et al., SKIPJACK Review: Interim Report, in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, 119, 119-20 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1994). Members of the expert group
included: Ernest F. Brickell, Dorothy E. Denning, Stephen T. Kent, David P. Maher,
and Walter Tuchman. Id.
221. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 168, at 112.
222. Id. at 112-13. The experts issued their joint report in July 1993. Id.
223. Brickell et al., SKIPJACK Review: An Interim Report, in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 220, at 122. Attacks constitute attempts to determine either the
key employed to encrypt the data or the message in its readable form. Id. A brute force
attack is also called an exhaustive search. Id. A brute force attack occurs when a com-
puter user "tries all possible keys" until one is found that decrypts the data. Id. The
amount of time required to perform a brute force attack is directly related to the length
of the keys. Id. A hypothetical, future, supercomputer costing US$50 million would
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does not conceal any weakness within its algorithm. 2 4 The re-
port also confirms the U.S. Government's assertions that
SKIPJACK appears to be the strongest algorithm currently avail-
able on the international encryption market.22 5
2. Enhanced U.S. Law Enforcement Capabilities
The key escrow technology incorporated into EES chips en-
ables U.S. Government agencies to intercept personal data com-
munications encrypted with EES technology for law enforce-
ment purposes.226 Interception of crime-related communica-
tions provides law enforcement agencies with the information
necessary to prevent crimes and prosecutors with incriminating
evidence to prosecute criminal offenders. 22 '7  The law enforce-
take approximately 4 million years to break SKIPJACK by a brute force attack. Id.
SKIPJACK evaluators concluded:
Under an assumption that the cost of processing power is halved every eight-
een months, it will be 36 years before the cost of breaking SKIPJACK by ex-
haustive search will be equal to the cost of breaking [DES] today. Thus, there
is no significant risk that SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive search in the
next 30-40 years.
Id. at 118.
224. Id. at 113; see Slovick, supra note 150, at 117 (reporting that Dr. Matthew
Blaze, computer scientist at Bell Laboratories, created computer program that prevents
anyone, including U.S. Government, from intercepting communication encrypted with
EES technology).
225. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encnyption Technology, in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, supra note 168, at 113.
226. OTA, supra note 15, at 116; see Slovick, supra note 150, at 116 (stating that law
enforcement agencies need ability to intercept and monitor content of calls made elec-
tronically by mobsters, terrorists, and drug dealers). U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, Benefits and
Costs of Legislation to Ensure the Government's Continued Capability to Investigate Crime with
the Implementation of New Telecommunications Technologies, Document C.A. 92-2117 (368)
(testimony of David C. Williams, Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting
Office). "Electronic surveillance is another tool that has been of great value to the law
:enforcement community to combat the La Cosa Nostra ("LCN") [organized crime fami-
lies]. Evidence gathered through electronic surveillance... has had a devastating im-
pact on organized crime." Id. Statistics from 1985-91 regarding the success of elec-
tronic surveillance include: 7,324 individuals convicted; US$295,851,162 in fines levied,
US$756,363,288 in court-ordered recoveries, restitutions and forfeitures, and
US$1,862,414,937 in prevented potential economic loss. Id. Electronic surveillance has
also prevented terrorist incidents. Id. "[A] terrorist rocket attack against a United
States ally by a foreign-based terrorist group was thwarted, and the electronic surveil-
lance- based investigation led to the arrest of the principals and to the prevention of the
loss of life of scores of persons." Id.
227. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption Key
Components in conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to State Statutes (1994) (discussing pro-
cedure for release of keys to prosecutors).
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ment access field 228 ("LEAF") included on each EES chip facili-
tates data interception. 229 Each LEAF contains the identity of
the individual chip employed to encrypt data and the computer
user's chip-unique key.23 ° The LEAF electronically reveals the
identity of the individual chip, allowing the law enforcement
agency to retrieve the components of the escrowed chip-unique
key from the designated escrow agents. 2
3 1
U.S. Government agencies may only obtain an escrowed key
for law enforcement purposes.23 2 The agencies must first receive
legal authorization to obtain the escrowed key.23 3 The agencies
must then present the authorization to the governmental bodies
that hold the components of the key in escrw. 23 4 U.S. Govern-
ment agencies that retrieve the components of the chip-unique
key from the designated escrow agents combine the two parts of
the key and decrypt the encrypted information. 35 When the law
enforcement agents complete the interception, the key's ability
to decrypt data encrypted with a particular chip terminates. 3 6
228. OTA, supra note 15, at 117. Each EES chip contains a law enforcement access
field ("LEAF") that allows data communications to be easily decrypted when the
equivalent of a legal wiretap has been authorized. Id.
229. Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Schuyler, supra note 181, at 46 (citing Kent Walker, assistant U.S. Attorney
in San Francisco) (explaining that Department ofJustice monitors purposes for which
keys are obtained). But see Garner, supra note 90, at 54 (conceding that although es-
crow agents are only authorized to relinquish keys for law enforcement purposes, possi-
bility exists that keys will be revealed illegally, and used to perpetrate acts of fraud and
bribery). To illustrate the possible illegal uses of keys:
Both John Walker and Aldridge Ames committed treason for money, not ide-
ology. In Walker's case, that information was the actual cryptographic keys
used by the US Navy, allowing the Soviets to decipher submarine communica-
tions. Now imagine how much a hostile power might pay for every escrowed
key used within the United States.
Id.
233. See Questions and Answers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy,
supra note 188 (noting that authorization to obtain escrowed keys is usually court or-
dered).
234. Questions and Answers About the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy, supra
note 188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (examining functions of Com-
merce and Treasury Departments).
235. OTA, supra note 15, at 117.
236. Key Escrow Announcements, supra note 179; see Schuyler, supra note 181, at 46
(citing Kent Walker) (explaining that each escrowed key was designed to work for only
one specific serial number chip).
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-. C. Potential Disadvantages of EES
The establishment of EES as the de facto enci-ption stan-
dard in the United States will engender disadvantages that do
not justify the implementation of this system.217 U.S. businesses
that are engaged in international, computerized transactions will
suffer economically because EES technology is incompatible
with the state of the art security standard outlined in Article
17.238 Additionally, the U.S. Government's manipulation of en-
cryption export controls to establish widespread implementation
of EES handicaps U.S. encryption software manufacturers' abil-
ity to compete in the international encryption market.23 9 Fur-
thermore, worldwide availability of DES and RSA inhibits the
U.S. Government from realizing the law enforcement benefits
attributed to EES' key escrow technology.2
1. Incompatibility with Article 17
While Article 17 provides individual EU Member States with
discretion regarding which specific security measures data con-
trollers may implement when processing personal data, Article
17 ensures that all EU Member States require data controllers to
secure personal data with state of the art technology.241 EU
Member States, unwilling to provide the U.S. Government with
the ability to eavesdrop on communications conveyed over EU
computer networks,242 have indicated that EES's key escrow fea-
ture prevents this encryption system from satisfying the state of
237. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (emphasizing negative conse-
quences of EES).
238. See supra notes 79-84, 171-80 and accompanying text (describing state of art
standard in Article 17 and key escrow technology featured in EES).
239. Bob Violino, Encyption Triggers Competition, INFo. WK., Feb. 7, 1994, at 15.
240. New SPA Study: Export Regulations Preclude U.S. Companies From Cashing in on
Multi-Million Dollar Encryption Software Market, U.S. NEwswiRE, Sept. 1, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File [hereinafter New SPA Study]. A study released by the
Software Publishers Association ("SPA") identifies 215 encryption products manufac-
tured in twenty foreign counties, including: Russia, Japan, South Africa, Germany, In-
dia, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Id. The study also reported that eighty-four out
of these 215 encryption products employ DES technology. Id.
241. 1995 Directive No. 1/95, supra note 1, art. 17(1), O/J. L 93/01, at 12 (1995).
242. See Schuyler, supra note 181, at 48 (discussing EU states' reluctance to allow
U.S. Government surveillance). "[W]hy would an overseas customer who needs to be
sure of data security buy a product which they know the U.S. government has access to."
Kleiner, supra note 141, at 15.
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the art standard outlined in Article 17.243 The incompatibility of
EES and Article 17 will severely inhibit the ability of U.S. busi-
nesses to conduct international data communications because
EU Member States will prohibit these communications from en-
tering their jurisdictions.2 4
2. Impediments to U.S. Encryption Manufacturers
U.S. encryption software manufacturers claim that stringent
U.S. export controls on encryption software, such as DES and
RSA, restrict their ability to participate in the growing interna-
tional encryption market.2 45 Computer users in the European
Union are unable to purchase these encryption devices from
U.S. manufactures because stringent encryption export controls
prevent devices manufactured in the United States from enter-
ing the international encryption market.24 Additionally, export
controls on DES and RSA compel U.S. businesses operating
outside the United States to purchase these encryption systems
from non-U.S. manufacturers. 47 Further, although the U.S.
Government permits the exportation of EES, computer users op-
erating outside the United States do not purchase EES technol-
ogy. 248 These computer users do not want the U.S. Government
to eavesdrop on their data communications. 249 U.S. encryption
software manufacturers' inability to export DES and RSA, com-
bined with the international disinterest in EES technology, de-
243. See supra notes 79-84, 141-80 and accompanying text (describing state of art
standard in Article 17 and key escrow technology featured in EES).
244. Schuyler, supra note 181, at 48.
245. New SPA Study, supra note 240. "Because [strong encryption] products cannot
be exported, their manufacturers cannot compete with the rapidly growing number of
foreign firms in the encryption market." Id.; see Violino, supra note 239, at 15 (stating
that letter was sent to Vice President Al Gore from Chief Executive Officers of eight
U.S. software manufacture companies, asking Clinton Administration to eliminate ex-
port controls on strong encryption technology).
246. See Cryptography Policy, supra note 3, at 111 (noting that although U.S. software
manufacturers control approximately seventy-five percent of market, encryption export
controls do not allow U.S. market share in cryptographic products sold internationally
to rise above fifty percent).
247. Id. "[A] recent survey of Fortune 500 companies conducted for the Business
Software Alliance ("BSA"), a Washington-based vendor group that represents compa-
nies that wrote to Gore, shows that more than one-third would consider buying en-
crypted software from foreign suppliers for their overseas offices." Id.
248. Mr. Rohrabacher, supra note 185.
249. Id. "[No one overseas will buy our.., computer equipment. Why should
they? Why should they pay us money so we can eavesdrop on them?" Id.
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prives the U.S. encryption software industry of billions of dollars
of potential annual revenue. 5 °
3. Resistance to the Implementation of EES
The U.S. Government can only reap the law enforcement
benefits attributed to EES' key escrow technology if every com-
puter user in the United States, including every criminal, en-
crypts data with EES technology.2 51 Successfully establishing
EES as the de facto encryption standard, however, will not pro-
duce this result.2 52 The establishment of EES as the de facto en-
cryption standard will compel many computer users who are not
conducting crime-related communications over computer net-
works to encrypt data with EES technology.2 53 Computer users
conducting crime-related data communications, however, will
not encrypt data with EES.254 Criminals, unwilling to facilitate
the ability of the U.S. Government to eavesdrop on crime-related
communications, will obtain competing encryption devices, such
as DES and RSA, from non-U.S. manufacturers. 5 5 DES and
RSA, although invented in the United States, are manufactured
worldwide.2 56  Criminals' ability to avoid encrypting crime-re-
250. See Violino, supra note 239, at 15 (explaining that BSA estimates that U.S.
manufacturers stand to lose US$9 billion dollars in revenue in 1995 and tens of
thousands of jobs as result of stringent encryption export controls).
251. Garner, supra note 90, at 51.
252. See id. (concluding that criminals will not encrypt data with EES technology).
253. Fallows, supra note 21, at 50. "By establishing 'EES] as a standard, the gov-
ernment hopes to keep encryption.., from becoming so cheap that anyone can walk
into a Radio Shack and buy a perfectly secure phone." Id.
254. Id. "The stated reason for a scrambling chip that permits wiretapping is that
otherwise terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals might use untappable scrambling
schemes. With lEES technology] they still can." Id.
255. See Daly, supra note 91, at 79 (stating that study conducted by Software Pub-
lishers Association in Washington, D.C. reports that DES and RSA are flourishing
abroad); supra note 240 and accompanying text (listing non-U.S. nations that manufac-
ture DES and RSA).
256. Fallows, supra note 21, at 50.
By establishing [EES] as a standard, the government hopes to keep encryp-
tion, especially public-key systems, from becoming so cheap and convenient
that anyone can walk into a Radio Shack and buy a perfectly secure phone...
it is guaranteed to be-least effective against the most serious criminal oppo-
nents, such as state-sponsored terrorist rings that will not be limited to what
they can find at Radio Shack.
Id.; Kleiner, supra note 141, at 14 (citing Chris Castor, a computer consultant and mem-
ber of Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board). "If you tell crooks that if
they use [EES] the law enforcement people are going to be able to intercept your calls,
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lated communications with EES technology will prevent law en-
forcement agencies from intercepting these communications,
and will thereby impede the enhancement of law enforcement
capabilities.25 7
D. Recent Developments
On August 17, 1995, the Clinton Administration yielded to
pressure from U.S. encryption software manufacturers258 and
pledged to develop a proposal to modify the U.S. Government's
current positions on data security and encryption export con-
trols.2159 This proposal will introduce an alternative encryption
system to EES.26 ° This new encryption system will, like EES, in-
volve escrowed keys. 261 The Clinton Administration, however,
will consider allowing non-governmental entities to act as the es-
crow agents of the keys.262 Under the proposal, the U.S. Govern-
ment will be required to acquire a search warrant to obtain the
key from the non-governmental escrow agent.2 63
The proposal will also suggest modifications of the U.S. Gov-
ernment's policy on encryption export controls.264 Currently,
export controls permit U.S. encryption software manufacturers
to export encryption devices with keys containing no more than
forty bits.265 The Clinton Administration will consider allowing
they're not going to use it. Deducing this does not need rocket science." Id. But see
Baker, Don't Worry Be Happy, in BUIDINc IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 90, at 298 (recog-
nizing that for criminals to scramble information with encryption devices, criminals
must first purchase and distribute expensive gear to all participating criminals, but few
criminals possess sufficient resources to accomplish this).
257. Fallows, supra note 21, at 50 (quoting statement ofJim Kallstrom, FBI Special
Agent in charge of New York). "Will some criminals catch on to the system, and buy
their encryption from, let's say, Israel? Yes. Will that be a problem? Yes." Id.
258. See U.S. to Urge A New Policy on Software, supra note 186, at Dl (explaining that
officials from encryption software industry recently wrote to Vice President Al Gore and
requested that negotiations about U.S. encryption policy resume).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.; Daniel Pearl, Encryption-Software Plan Presented Using 'Keys' Held by Escrow
Agents, WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 1995, at A3. "[T ] he government would have to get a search
warrant to obtain the key from a company holding it on behalf of the person sending or
receiving encrypted messages." Id.
262. See Pearl, supra note 261, at A3 (noting that certification process of escrow
agents to exclude criminals remains unresolved issue).
263. Id.
264. U.S. to Urge A New Policy on Software, supra note 186, at D1.
265. Id. at D6.
The vulnerability of 40-bit systems was underscored [on August 16, 1995, when
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the export of encryption devices containing keys with sixty-four
bits, the length of the key incorporated into the DES system.266
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ABANDON EES AND
PROMOTE AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD THAT ENSURES
CONTINUED U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE
The prospect of incompatible EU and U.S. data security re-
quirements, 267 U.S. encryption software manufactures' exclusion
from the international encryption market, and U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies' inability to realize the potential law enforcement
benefits associated with EES outweigh the advantage of ad-
vanced security afforded by EES technology.268 Accordingly, the
U.S. Government should abandon its quest to establish EES as
the de facto U.S. encryption standard and should instead pro-
mote an international data security standard.269 To facilitate the
implementation of this international data security standard, an
international entity should be established to hold keys in escrow.
An international standard would eliminate all incompatibilities
between national data security laws and would facilitate data
processing across national borders. 270 Despite the advantages as-
a] French student decoded a message that had been encoded using the 40-bit
security feature... [t] he student... used 120 computers in a campus network
to simultaneously test every key possible in a short period. It took him eight
days, but he was able to decode a single encoded.., message.
Id.
266. See id. (noting that U.S. Government will only consider allowing export of
encryption devices with 64-bits if decoding keys are held in escrow for access by law
enforcement agencies). "A 64-bit program would, theoretically, be 65,000 times harder
to crack than a 40-bit program." Id.
267. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing incompatibility of
EU and U.S. data security requirements). The following hypothetical illustrates the
standards' incompatibility: Person A, who works at Bank X in Paris, asks Person B, who
works at a financial institution Y in New York, to transmit personal data regarding Per-
son C. Person A, as the data controller, must ensure that the data transmitted by Per-
son B is protected with state of the art security measures. If the U.S. Government suc-
cessfully establishes EES as the ce facto encryption standard, Person B will likely imple-
ment EES to encrypt data. However, if the French Government does not consider EES
state of the art, under French law, Person A will not be permitted to receive the data.
268. See supra notes 215-57 and accompanying text (discussing advantages and dis-
advantages associated with EES technology).
269. See Cryptography Policy, supra note 3, at 116-17 (discussing various U.S. Govern-
ment options regarding data security, and potential consequences of these options).
270. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing incompatibilities
that prevent data processing across national borders).
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sociated with an international standard, however, the U.S. Gov-
ernment has not indicated whether it will consider the develop-
ment of international data security standard.2 71
On August 17, 1995, the Clinton Administration responded
to critics of EES2 72 by pledging to develop a proposal for a new
data security standard that would replace EES.273 Although the
proposal will advocate the replacement of Government key es-
crow agents with non-govemmental key escrow agents, the U.S.
Government will not relinquish its ability to acquire keys for law
enforcement purposes.2 74 This proposed alternative does not
eliminate the concerns of computer users in the European
Union and the United States who are plagued by incompatible
personal data security laws.2 75 The U.S. Government's contin-
ued ability to eavesdrop on data communication encrypted with
the proposed standard will render this encryption system incom-
patible with Article 17's state of the art standard. 276 EU Member
States, therefore, will continue to prohibit data communications
encrypted with key escrow technology from entering their juris-
dictions.277 Furthermore, even if the European Union declares
that the proposed encryption system satisfies Article 17's state of
the art standard, creating an alternative encryption device re-
quires significant research and development.278 If the U.S. Gov-
ernment continues to manipulate the U.S. encryption market
and to impose restrictive encryption export controls, EES will be-
come the defacto standard in the United States before an alterna-
tive device is developed. 79
271. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Government
proposal for data security, which is to be implemented solely in United States).
272. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of EES).
273. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 7. "The Administration is announc-
ing its intent to work with industry to develop other key escrow products that might
better meet the needs of individuals and industry." Id.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 241-44, 267 (describing potential consequences of incompati-
ble data security standards in European Union and United States).
276. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (describing EU states' reluctance
to allow U.S. Government to eavesdrop on data communications).
277. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (noting that incompatibility of two
standards compels U.S. states to prohibit data encrypted with EES from entering juris-
dictions).
278. See supra note 90 (recognizing that development of encryption technology is
time-consuming and expensive because of need to test strength of algorithm).
279. See supra notes 188-214 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Govern-
ment's manipulation of encryption market and export controls).
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The U.S. Government's most viable alternative is to concur-
rently terminate all attempts to transform EES into the de facto
encryption standard in the United States and to facilitate the ac-
cessibility of all currently available encryption devices, including
DES and RSA.280 This alternative eliminates the disadvantages
associated with EES in an inexpensive 28 and non-disruptive
manner. 282 Although the U.S. Government considers this solu-
tion unsatisfactory because it prevents the enhancement of U.S.
law enforcement capabilities, 8  no peace-time precedent sug-
gests that the U.S. Government possesses the ability to mandate
EES, or any other key escrow system. 84 The U.S. Government
continues to rely on voluntary compliance of EES.2 85 Accord-
ingly, computer users processing personal data between the
United States and the European Union can avoid the disadvan-
tages associated with EES by refraining from employing this sys-
tem or by implementing alternative encryption devices.286
CONCLUSION
The advanced data security afforded by EES does notjustify
the economic disadvantages attributed to widespread implemen-
tation of this system. To avoid these disadvantages, the U.S. Gov-
ernment should terminate all attempts to establish EES as the de
facto U.S. encryption standard. Facilitating the availability of all
encryption devices, such as DES and RSA, allows: (a) computer
users in the United States to protect data with strong encryption
devices; (b) businesses to conduct international data communi-
cations; and (c) U.S. encryption software manufacturers to par-
ticipate in the international encryption market. The U.S. Gov-
280. See supra notes 132-62 and accompanying text (presenting DES and RSA en-
cryption systems).
281. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (specifying costs expended for crea-
tion and upkeep of the EES key escrow system).
282. See supra notes 237-57 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages asso-
ciated with EES technology).
283. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Government's
most recent proposal, which involves key escrow technology); but see supra notes 251-57
and accompanying text (describing inability of EES to substantially enhance U.S. Gov-
ernment law enforcement capabilities).
284. Fallows, supra note 21, at 49-50.
285. Id.
286. Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn, in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 199,
at 313. "Don't buy any product with Big Brother inside. [The U.S. Government] can-
not, as yet, require you to do so. Just say no." Id.
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ernment's refusal to facilitate the availability of all encryption
devices will ultimately exclude the United States from participat-
ing in the international marketplace.
